Evolutionary and differential psychology: conceptual conflicts and the path to integration by Tim Marsh & Simon Boag
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 23 September 2013
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00655
Evolutionary and differential psychology: conceptual
conflicts and the path to integration
Tim Marsh* and Simon Boag
Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Edited by:
Karol Osipowicz, Jefferson
Neuroscience Hospital, USA
Reviewed by:
Lei Chang, Chinese University of
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Andreas Wilke, Clarkson University,
USA
*Correspondence:
Tim Marsh, Department of
Psychology, Macquarie University,
Balaclava Rd., North Ryde, Sydney,
NSW 2109, Australia
e-mail: timothy.marsh@mq.edu.au
Evolutionary psychology has seen the majority of its success exploring adaptive features
of the mind believed to be ubiquitous across our species. This has given rise to the
belief that the adaptationist approach has little to offer the field of differential psychology,
which concerns itself exclusively with the ways in which individuals systematically
differ. By framing the historical origins of both disciplines, and exploring the means
through which they each address the unique challenges of psychological description and
explanation, the present article identifies the conceptual and theoretical problems that
have kept differential psychology isolated not only from evolutionary psychology, but
from explanatory approaches in general. Paying special attention to these conceptual
problems, the authors review how these difficulties are being overcome by contemporary
evolutionary research, and offer instructive suggestions concerning how differential
researchers (and others) can best build upon these innovations.
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Psychology has been described as a science impaired by dis-
unity (Gladin, 1961; Meehl, 1978; Kantor, 1979; Staats, 1983,
1999; de Groot, 1990; Yanchar and Slife, 1997; Henriques, 2003,
2004, 2011; Goertzen, 2008, 2010; Mandler, 2011). There is, how-
ever, disagreement over precisely how large a problem theoretical
and institutional disunity is for psychologists and behavioral sci-
entists in general (Dixon, 1983; Baars, 1984, 1985; Matarazzo,
1987, 1992; Bower, 1993; Neisser, 1995; Kelly, 1998; Kassinove,
2002; Stam, 2004). Nevertheless, integration is widely considered
a desirable course of action, if only for the potential benefits
of combining disparate theories and findings within a common
conceptual space (Staats, 1999; Henriques, 2003, 2011; Goertzen,
2008). In recent years, the adaptationist approach of evolutionary
psychology has emerged as strong candidate for central inclusion
in a unifying meta-theory of psychology (Penke et al., 2007a,b;
Tooby and Cosmides, 2007; Webster, 2007; Daly and Wilson,
2008; Buss, 2009). Stated briefly, adaptationism is a paradigm
for analyzing the physical and behavioral characteristics of organ-
isms by focusing on functionally complex features which can only
arise through natural selective pressures (see Daly and Wilson,
1999 for a brief review of the origins of adaptationism in behav-
ioral science). Despite some enduring camps of resistance (Rose
and Rose, 2000; Buller, 2005; Richardson, 2007), the literature
shows a trend of increasing acceptance of adaptationism in diverse
fields of psychology (Confer et al., 2010; Fitzgerald andWhitaker,
2010). Many recent unification efforts orient around evolution-
ary theories and approaches (Sternberg and Grigorenko, 2001;
Henriques, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2011; Gintis, 2007). Nevertheless,
although the adaptationist approach can and has been readily
applied to an extensive range of psychological phenomena, as
highlighted in Confer et al. (2010) some areas of psychology pose
unique theoretical and methodological difficulties, which evolu-
tionists must (befittingly) adapt to. Perhaps the largest category
of phenomena that demands a revision of traditional adaptation-
ist analyses is the systematic occurrence of variation in normative
psychological characteristics, the domain of personality and indi-
vidual differences (Buss, 2009; Buss andHawley, 2011). As Confer
et al. (2010) summaries: “Evolutionary psychology has been far
more successful in predicting and explaining species-typical and
sex-differentiated psychological adaptations than explaining vari-
ation within species or within the sexes” (p. 123). The recent
innovations on this front discussed later in this article are best
appreciated relative to the history and present state of traditional
differential psychology.
Over the past century, the study of normative individual dif-
ferences in thought, behavior and ability (hereafter referred to
by the umbrella term “differential psychology”) has become one
of the largest and most popular arms of psychological science
(Lubinski, 2000; Borghans et al., 2011). Differential psychology
has intimate ties to multiple fields of applied psychology, includ-
ing psychometric assessment, developmental and educational
psychology, lifestyle and vocational adjustment, and our shifting
conceptions of psychopathology (Lubinski, 2000). Despite this,
differential psychology has a long history of remaining largely
theoretically autonomous from related sub-disciplines of psychol-
ogy. To this day, there is little cross-pollination between even
the largest areas of differential psychology and their immedi-
ately adjacent research fields (Mischel, 1968, 1973; Cervone, 1991;
Borsboom, 2005; Cramer et al., 2010). To illustrate the point, the
differential psychology domain of cognitive ability/intelligence
testing has developed largely independent of the insights of func-
tional cognitive psychology (Cronbach, 1957; Neisser et al., 1996;
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Garlick, 2002, 2003; Anderson, 2005). Additionally, differential
trait theories have become a prevailing approach in the study of
personality, whilst remaining predominantly separate from other
leading conceptions and models within personality psychology
(see Block, 1989, contrasted with 2010, for examples both before
and after the rise of the Five Factor Approach). Evolutionary psy-
chology represents only the most recent theoretical approach that
must now struggle to integrate with the relatively independent
niche carved out by the traditions of differential psychology.
While both evolutionary psychology and differential psychol-
ogy are immensely diverse and heterogeneous fields, the argu-
ments of this paper seek to cast as wide and as relevant a net
as possible. As such, primary focus shall be given to funda-
mental conceptual and methodological elements that are near-
ubiquitous characteristics of the respective fields, with more
specific examples drawn from the most relevant and representa-
tive research areas available. By utilizing some often overlooked
distinctions from the wider philosophy of science, examining the
fundamental scientific tasks of description and explanation (and
beyond this, forms of explanation), the authors seek to explore
the apparent theoretical isolation of differential psychology, and
argue that integration is possible only when descriptive efforts
are designed to inform causal explanations. In approaching this
contentious topic from a neglected theoretical perspective, this
paper contributes a new argument to the collective evolutionary-
differential integration efforts started by David Buss almost 30
years ago (1984), an argument designed to address the fundamen-
tal conceptual concerns echoed by some critics of evolutionary
psychology (Buller, 2005; Richardson, 2007). The current state
of integration efforts and possible future avenues for individual
differences research will also be discussed.
A COMMON ANCESTOR
During the formative period of the late 1800s, the precursors of
both evolutionary and differential psychology were initially pro-
posed as means to a common end. Methodologies emphasizing
species-typical features and those emphasizing between-subjects
variation share a number of common ancestors, perhaps the most
illustrative of which is the career of Sir Francis Galton (Galton,
1889; Allen, 2002). Whereas vaguely evolutionarily-guided bio-
logical insights have shaped such influential theories as those of
Sigmund Freud (Young, 2006) and B. F. Skinner (Skinner, 1966,
1984), Galton (a half-cousin to Charles Darwin) focused very
specifically on the application of several Darwinian principles to
studying the human species (Forest, 1995).
Galton is of central relevance to the history of personality
and individual differences (Bynum, 2002), having pioneered the
psychometric assessment of both abilities and dispositions, first
articulating the paradigm of “nature vs. nurture,” and develop-
ing statistical methods oriented around correlation and the use of
regression toward the mean with standard deviations (Simonton,
2003). Though now remembered poorly for his advocacy of
eugenics, Galton’s endeavors in measuring variability and supple-
menting selective pressures in human populations were two nec-
essary components of a single ambition: to preserve and aid the
evolution of the human species, with particular regard towards
human intelligence and character (Jensen, 2002; Seligman, 2002).
Galton understood that the most crucial aspects of Darwin’s
theory of evolution by natural selection can be broken down
into two discrete concepts. Firstly, that all populations of organ-
isms contain some meaningfully heritable variation, and second,
that the differential efficacy of these variants with regard to
the demands of survival and reproduction produce a form of
selection (Darwin, 1859, 1871). The representative properties
of any species will reliably change over time, in such a man-
ner as to increase their contextual reproductive success, so long
as sufficient variation and selection can occur. In the introduc-
tory pages of their recent edited book, Buss and Hawley (2011)
state flatly: “Individual differences are indispensible for natural
selection. Without heritable variants, natural selection—the only
known process capable of creating and maintaining functional
adaptations—could not occur.” (p. ix).
From this perspective, we can appreciate, in much the same
manner as Galton and his contemporaries, that the study of pop-
ulation variation and the study of selective pressures are two
sides to the same coin. Both aspects are necessary to under-
stand the history and present-state of biological and psychological
functioning, and our richest insights must be born of complex
interactions between the two. Thus, to understand the apparent
rift that has since formed between these two philosophically con-
gruent fields, one must turn an eye to their separate trajectories
of historical implementation.
CONTRASTING FOCUSES AND CONFLICTING METHODS
The technological progression of the past 150 years has precluded
the study of human variation and the study of human evolu-
tionary design from developing hand-in-hand. Darwin’s original
articulation of evolutionary theory was inhibited from its incep-
tion by a lack of insight into the molecular mechanisms of
heredity. While basic inheritance of biological traits had been
well-observed, it was not until more than 50 years later, when
Mendel’s theories of genetics and Morgan’s chromosome theory
were integrated, that biologists were in a position to undertake
meaningful investigations into the propagation of varying traits
throughout a population (Huxley, 1942; Dennett, 1995a; Bowler,
2003; Olsson et al., 2006). From the beginning of the 20th century,
the study of selective pressures was impaired for many decades,
awaiting both the gradual stockpiling of heritability data, and
the development of molecular-genetic and computer-modeling
techniques.
During this time, several disciplines focusing on measuring
and predicting population variation thrived (Stern, 1911), most
notably the burgeoning field of differential psychology (Lamiell,
2003; Bergman and Trost, 2006; Uher, 2008). These early endeav-
ors did not suffer at all in the absence of a study of selection, for
the findings themselves were considered simply a cross-section of
a presumably changing population. Since selection can only occur
between generations, only measures of variation spanning over
two or more generations would require insights into selection to
be understood. It is during this period, while selection-focused
sciences were still handicapped by technology that differential
psychology flourished.
The early differential techniques fed strongly into many of the
experimental psychology approaches of the era (Tucker et al.,
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2005), enduring the dominance of behaviorism to then be rein-
vigorated by the cognitive revolution that followed (Block, 1989;
Baum, 1994; Mandler, 2002; Miller, 2003). During this time,
differential psychologists distanced themselves from the rapidly
shifting theories in related fields, and came to rely heavily on
their robust statistical constructs and improving ability to predict
outcomes (Lubinski, 2000; Maltby et al., 2007). Growing beyond
initial interests in improving the process of military recruitment,
differential psychology forged close relationships with many areas
of applied psychology (Tyler, 1965). The domains of personality-
and intelligence-testing in particular, grew ever-more promi-
nent in predicting and informing outcomes including educational
development, vocational selection, risk-management, and mental
and physical health outcomes, to name only a few (Karasek, 1979;
Lubinski, 2000; Marks et al., 2005; Reisner, 2005; Maltby et al.,
2007).
From the late 1980s to the present day, differential psychology
has fortified its position as a central pillar of psychological science,
with influential constructs such as the “g” factor of intelligence
and trait models of personality standing at the center of decades
of empirical support (Chamorro-Premuzic and Furhnam, 2006;
Reeve and Charles, 2008; Block, 2010). Contemporary personal-
ity and individual differences research is defined by constructs
that rely little on grounding theories, but rather, are built on
robust statistical data drawn from large populations (Borsboom,
2005). One might thus presume that researchers would regard
differential psychology constructs as having limited or strictly
instrumental use, relative to the explanatory theories they diverge
from. To the contrary, however, trends in the literature sug-
gest that differential constructs are thriving, while theory-based
and qualitative research approaches are systematically disfavored
(Rogers, 2000). One explanation for this bias is the “quantitative
imperative” (Michell, 1990, 2003a,b): “The quantitative impera-
tive is the view that in science, when you cannot measure, you
do not really know what you’re talking about, but when you can,
you do” (Michell, 2003a p.5). According to Michell (2005) this
quantitative imperative acts both as an explicit principle and as
a subtle network of social and institutional biases. Through such
influences, the individual differences field has come to embrace
its historical overspecialization in nomothetic statistics as evi-
dence of true scientific validity (Borsboom et al., 2004; Borsboom,
2005).
In contrast, early attempts to address human psychologi-
cal phenomena with reference to selective pressures only began
to emerge in the latter half of the 20th century, under the
umbrella-term “sociobiology” (Hamilton, 1954; Wilson, 1975).
These attempts ultimately proved conceptually inadequate, as
many were highly reminiscent of the genetic-determinist theories
then-prevalent in ethology and zoology, or depended intimately
on the then-controversial prospect of group-selection (Gould and
Lewontin, 1979; Gould, 1981; Vining, 1986). Only in the late
1980s did the adaptationist paradigm of evolutionary psychol-
ogy fully emerge (Buss, 1984, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1989;
Tooby andCosmides, 1989), requiring another decade of develop-
ment before the approach became widely acknowledged (Confer
et al., 2010; Fitzgerald and Whitaker, 2010). Evolutionary psy-
chologists established a refined adaptationist approach, drawing
from contemporary cognitive psychology to strongly emphasize
the modularity and domain-specificity of hypothesized psycho-
logical adaptations (Cosmides and Tooby, 1987, 1997; Nesse and
Lloyd, 1992; Pinker and Bloom, 1992; Pinker, 1997). Evolutionary
psychology specifically targeted those features of psychological
functioning which are species-typical mechanisms that evolved
in response to the recurring survival and reproductive challenges
of Pleistocene epoch human ancestors (Buss, 1999, 2005). Such
species-typical features offer an important means of empirical
hypothesis-testing, as only ubiquitous, biologically-based features
are likely to exist in similar forms cross-culturally (Buss et al.,
1990; Barkow et al., 1992; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992; Buss, 2005).
As of the beginning of the 21st century, an apt summary
of the two fields was that evolutionary psychology focuses on
the features which are shared across our species, while differen-
tial psychology focuses on the ways in which the members of
our species systematically differ (Borghans et al., 2011). Given
their shared origins, one might presume that findings of the
two approaches must be intrinsically disposed to integration.
However, despite some attempts dating back to the formative
years of evolutionary psychology (Buss, 1984, 1991), integration
efforts have faced theoretical and practical difficulties, to a degree
that some view as an interdisciplinary hostility (Anderson, 2005;
Muncer, 2011).
To understand this divide, it is necessary to explore some of
the unique conceptual challenges that afflict psychology research
more so than almost any other field of science. These conceptual
difficulties lend disproportionate weight to variations in approach
and methods, and are a driving force behind the characteristic
rifts between the sub-disciplines of psychology (see Goertzen,
2008 for a diverse account). Moreover, an exploration of these
issues can offer an insight into the asymmetrical unification
attempts between evolutionary and differential psychology espe-
cially (Pinker, 2002; Tooby et al., 2005; Rodeheffer et al., 2011),
and provide specificmeans throughwhich such conflicts may, and
must, be overcome.
THE UNIQUE CHALLENGES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY
In order to discuss the challenges that psychology faces as a
science, it is necessary to first clarify precisely what is meant
by “science.” While views on what constitutes “science” vary
(Salmon, 1989; Gaukroger, 2006), the scientific enterprise gen-
erally consists of two major elements: the systematic observation
and description of a particular set of natural phenomena, and
the theory-guided explanation of the causes of said phenomena
(Wilson, 1998; Cervone, 1999; Boag, 2011). In employing this def-
inition, the authors seek to approximate the position advocated by
Wilson (1998), and emphasize that the role of science is to “factor
out human values” through procedural error-checking, with the
goal of developing “representations of reality that are as accurate
as possible.”
A SCIENCE WITHIN A BLACK BOX
To understand the conceptual difficulties of psychological inquiry,
it is illustrative to regard all aspects that cannot be immedi-
ately observed as existing within a figurative “black box.” In the
engineering sciences, a “black box” is the catch-all term for any
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system that has traceable outputs, and at least somewhat traceable
inputs, but of which one can gain little to no direct insight into
the internal processes that bridge between them (House, 1991;
Nairne, 1997; Astbury and Leeuw, 2010). The black box nature
of psychological phenomena poses few difficulties for the tasks
of observation and description, as these are generally concerned
with the system’s inputs and outputs (behaviors, levels of activity,
etc.). Black boxes do, however, pose substantial challenges to the
task of explanation.
Since a phenomenon can only be explained via reference to
those related antecedents which, in the past, caused its current
state, black box systems concern observable phenomena (the out-
puts and inputs of the black box) which have causal relations
to elements and/or objects that cannot be observed (Kitcher,
1985; Salmon, 1989; Cervone, 1999; Ketelaar and Ellis, 2000;
Hüttemann and Love, 2011). Any explanatory account of the
inputs or outputs of a black box must by necessity contain some
incomplete space, permitting nothing more concrete than specu-
lation. As an example, consider an alarm clock, with the standard
inputs (an electric power cord) and outputs (patterns of light and
sound).While onemight reasonably presume that the device con-
tains electrical circuits that keep time, we must acknowledge that
without opening the box, one can only speculate as to precisely
what form these internal components take. Relying only on the
inputs and outputs, we have no means with which to distinguish
betweenmultiple options that achieve the same overt patterns, for
any mechanism capable of keeping time, regardless of method,
would be functionally identical.
This limitation underpins one of the defining characteris-
tics of the scientific method: hypothesis-testing, which acts as
an algorithmic process comprised of both the generative and
selective phases that most diagnostic procedures rely on (Fisher,
1925; Kaplan, 1964). It is common when investigating natural
phenomena to only have a subset amenable to direct mea-
surement. As such, hypothesis-testing is employed to interpret
predictive patterns in that which is observed, to infer the pos-
sible characteristics of the variables that cannot be observed
(Bunge, 1963; Beizer, 1995). The black box metaphor need not
only refer to physical limitations, but rather, a situation can
present as a “black box” relative to the means of the investiga-
tor. Any situation is figuratively a black box, if vital explanatory
details are amenable only to the hypothesis-testing of peripheral
phenomena.
From a methodological perspective, the fundamental limit to
the utility of hypothesis-testing is that a theory could only be
definitively “proven” via the exhaustive disproving of all possi-
ble alternative hypotheses. For most kinds of black box situations,
there are an effectively infinite number of alternative hypotheses
concerning the character of the hidden sections. Thus, heuris-
tics that guide investigators toward testing the most likely or
plausible hypotheses are the saving grace that renders actual
hypothesis-testing possible. Such heuristics are generally drawn
from theory, however, and the more extensive or multi-layered
the black box is, themore potentially inscrutable the input-output
contingencies become (Fisher, 1925; Bunge, 1963; Kaplan, 1964;
Beizer, 1995; Kaplan and Craver, 2011; also see Cervone, 1999 for
psychology-specific discussion).
This fundamental challenge of constructing explanatory theo-
ries for complex black box phenomena is the central philosophical
and conceptual difficulty that defines psychology as a science. To
a degree largely unshared by any other natural science, the black
box phenomena comprising the information-processing systems
of humans and other animals are near-insurmountably complex.
The subject matter of psychology concerns highly interpretable
stimuli, passing through immensely long, largely immeasurable,
variable and internally-referential causal sequences (Jaszczolt,
1996), to emerge as behavioral outputs that are themselves highly
interpretable (De Los Reyes and Kazdin, 2008).
As an immediate consequence of this, sub-disciplines of psy-
chology are particularly vulnerable to sectarianism and disunity.
Most fields of psychology have, understandably, built their theo-
ries and explanatory models using those insights most conducive
to answering their specific research questions (Matarazzo, 1992;
Kelly, 1998). As a result many fields of psychology make disso-
nant or contradictory pragmatic assumptions about those aspects
of the mental black box that they are not presently addressing.
The mutually incompatible assumptions that characterize differ-
ent research approaches appear to be responsible for the majority
of institutional disunity in psychology, including the rift between
evolutionary and differential psychology.
REFINING EXPLANATORY THEORIES
Although description is fundamentally necessary for explana-
tion to occur, explanation is arguably the highest goal of sci-
ence (Wilson, 1998; Cervone, 1999, 2005). As such, a research
approach in psychology is perhaps the best judged in terms of its
ability to constrain theories and predictions, so as to reliably draw
maximum utility out of practical hypothesis-testing (see Kaplan,
1964, chapter 2 for general elaboration; for discussion specific to
evolutionary psychology, see Resnik, 1996; Sober, 2000; Lewens,
2002).
There are, in general, three means of informing an explana-
tory theory prior to (or in conjunction with) prediction-testing
of input-output contingencies (Bunge, 1963). The first, and often
most difficult, option is to attempt to directly measure the con-
tents of the black box. In psychology, this may be achieved in two
ways: directly, through the use of various neuroimaging technolo-
gies, and analogously, through the invasive (generally surgical)
manipulations of non-human animals. While there is not nearly
sufficient space here to discuss the valuable psychological insights
that have been gathered through these respective methods (for
some key topics, see: Stevenson and Goldworth, 2002; Bennett
and Hacker, 2003; Tashiro, 2004; Filler, 2009; Dietrich and Kanso,
2010), for the specific purpose of theory-building their utility is
none-the-less akin to that of standard observation-based meth-
ods. While many intuitively assume that the real-time outputs of
fMRI scans provide privileged access to the content of the mind,
neuroimaging technologies only provide us with activity patterns,
which while potentially closely correlated with the information-
transformations of the mind, do not constitute direct measure-
ment of the phenomena in question (Caplan, 2009). Even if
neuroimaging techniques were so technologically refined as to
accurately discern specific action potentials and the dynamic den-
drite configurations of individual neurons, the interpretation of
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these patterns into meaningful psychological content could still
only be achieved via detailed correlation with some other source
of insight into said processes (Bennett andHacker, 2003). Though
immensely instructive, these methods cannot side-step the fun-
damental difficulties of hypothesis-testing, but rather can only be
taken alongside psychological testing as means of refining existing
hypotheses (Caplan, 2009; Filler, 2009).
The second option for refining theories independent of testing
involves the use of logical inference to determine what must be
the necessary minimum requirements of the systems in question,
assuming that said systems are physically internally consistent.
This method is extensively employed in computational cogni-
tive psychology (Fodor, 1975, 1983), and is the guiding heuristic
of all computational models (Neisser, 1967; Boden and Mellor,
1984; see chapter 4 of Boden, 2006 for a wider historical context).
While insufficiently discriminative in their own right, such logi-
cal inferences become vastly more powerful when supplied with
alternative insights into the limitations of the psychological pro-
cesses in question (for example, basic neurological insights into
the properties of neurons and regional clusters of the brain).
The third, and perhaps final option for refining explana-
tory theories, is the independent discovery of design details
(Lewens, 2002). In mechanical and electrical engineering, such
insights may take the form of early blueprints, listing all avail-
able materials and tools, or learning what objectives a system
was designed to implement (Dorst and Cross, 2001). In a man-
ner wholly analogous to engineered design by humans, abundant
evidence suggests that all organisms were designed (Dawkins,
2009), over a geological timescale, by a range of algorithmic evo-
lutionary forces [see chapter 8 of Dennett (1995a), for further
details].
Reliance upon details indicative of the design process is the
central principle of the adaptationist approach, and is thus the
heuristic core of evolutionary psychology (Buss, 2005). While
embracing the adaptationist approach is not strictly necessary
to gain some of the crucial benefits of the third aforemen-
tioned option (indeed any biological, medical, and developmental
insights into the properties of the nervous-system provide pow-
erful tools for use with the second and third), the adaptationist
approach is designed to draw as much theory-guiding informa-
tion as possible from the reciprocal relationships of form versus
function. Stated simply, adaptationist heuristics regard what a
mind is (structurally) as being intimately related to what a mind
does (functionally), by in turn acknowledging that how a mind
functions has been shaped by why it functions, in a Darwinian
sense (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2008).
REVERSE-ENGINEERING AND ADAPTATIONISM
The paradigm of evolutionary psychology is primarily concerned
with explanation, and this orientation has formed the basis of its
conceptual incompatibility with the most prominent domains of
differential psychology. By examining the explanatory methods
employed in evolutionary research, the authors will demon-
strate, by contrast, the explanatory short-cuts that have become
entrenched in differential psychology, which keep differential
researchers at odds not merely with adaptationists, but with
theoretically robust psychology in general.
THE GUIDANCE OF DESIGN
The adaptationist approach is the defining aspect of any work
of evolutionary psychology (Sober, 2000; Buss, 2005). An adap-
tation (when used as a noun) is understood to be a feature or
set of features of an organism, the apparent design or concerted
complexity of which suggest that it is a product of natural selec-
tion, and thus represents a relational calibration of said organism
to its ancestor’s recurring environmental challenges (Tooby and
Cosmides, 2005). At the heart of this paradigm is the suggestion
that the species-typical behavioral and cognitive regularities of
animals (of humans in particular), likely consist of, or are actively
shaped by, adaptations.
Evolutionary psychologists focus on adaptations primarily for
pragmatic, explanatory reasons.While all organisms are the prod-
ucts of natural selective forces (and artificial selection in domes-
ticated species), not all features of organisms are adaptations. In
the words of Tooby and Cosmides (2005, p. 25,26):
The cross-generationally recurrent design of an organism can
be partitioned into (1) adaptations, which are present because
they were selected for, (2) by-products of adaptations, which were
not themselves targets of selection but are present because they are
causally coupled to or produced by traits that were, and (3) noise,
which was injected by the stochastic components of evolution.
For reasons of logical necessity, it is nearly impossible to use
any positive criteria to confirm that some biological or psycho-
logical characteristic is either a by-product or phylogenetic noise.
However, a feature can generally be identified as an adaptation
when it shows contextual evidence of ‘good design’ with relation
to the adaptive problem or problems it is hypothesized to address
(Dennett, 1995a; Buss, 2005).
Functionally speaking, adaptations are relations between
organism characteristics and the fitness demands which statis-
tically favored those characteristics in their gene-pool (Dennett,
1995a; Sober, 2000; Dawkins, 2009). Thus, no trait can
be accurately described as an adaptation in the absence of
this feature-problem matching. For this reason, adaptationists
approach complex features with the postulation of possible adap-
tations, moving on to the possibilities of by-products and noise
when the evidence for adaptation is lacking or inadequate (Tooby
and Cosmides, 2005). The tell-tale signs of biological design are
the clues used by evolutionary psychologists to generate and
refine theories about the probable structure and development
of a psychological adaptation, utilizing the intrinsic relation-
ships between the form and function of a well-designed system
(Dennett, 1995a; Pinker, 1997, 2002; Tooby and Cosmides, 2005).
Investigations of this sort are appropriately referred to as “reverse-
engineering” (Buss, 2005), though it is worth noting that in
seeking to gain insight into black box structures through inference
from observable input-output contingencies, one could easily
argue any psychologist employing explanatory theories is, by
necessity, a reverse-engineer (Dennett, 1995b).
LITERAL STRUCTURES DEFINED BY FUNCTION
Evolutionary theory regards the “mind” as a coordinated system
of fitness-enhancing problem-solving apparatus. These hypothe-
sized adaptations are specified to strictly consist of computational
neurophysiological structures (Crawford, 2000; Cosmides and
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Tooby, 2001; Tooby and Cosmides, 2005). The existence, perfor-
mance, and related properties of these adaptations are predicated
upon the function they were selected for (Sappington, 1990; Keri,
2003). This focus on information-processes clearly lends itself to
many process models in psychology, while many other targeted
phenomena in psychology, such as intrinsic ‘traits’ (Church et al.,
2006), internal representations (Fuhrman and Boroditsky, 2010),
and qualitative mental states (Markus, 1998), can be under-
stood as calibrated components, products, and observation-level
descriptions of psychological processes (see Buss, 2005 for fur-
ther detail). In contemporary evolutionary psychology, such
structures are defined as psychological mechanisms, commonly
further designated into processing “modules” (see Buss, 1995;
Cosmides and Tooby, 2005, concerning the Massive Modularity
Hypothesis).
This account of causally-integrated psychological mechanisms
is vital to the conceptual lexicon of evolutionary psychology, and
sets a clear yet inclusive standard for the compatible expression
of any scientifically viable explanatory psychological construct
(including those not thought to be adaptations). The viabil-
ity of proposing such structures depends largely on evidence
found in concerted phenotypic function. As such, the adap-
tationist approach also provides a unique means of bridging
the gap between literal and non-literal construct-based theories,
because any construct that is defined by its function is conceivable
and testable as a literal, neurophysical psychological mechanism
(Dennett, 1995b). Despite these evident benefits, it is precisely
this concept of psychological mechanisms, and the detailed
explanatory approach that such a conception demands, that is
responsible for the much of incompatibility between the theories
and approaches of evolutionary and differential psychology.
TOP-DOWN EXPLANATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE
CONSTRUCTS
There is perhaps no more fitting a characterization of differen-
tial psychology than as a field that endeavors to be descriptive.
The methodologies and conceptual-tools of differential psychol-
ogy are supremely well-adapted to the tasks of summarizing and
extracting the statistical cores of behaviorally-recurrent trends
in populations. With such immense statistical credentials, differ-
ential psychology is considered perhaps the greatest beneficiary
of the above-mentioned quantitative imperative in behavioral
science (Michell, 2003a). Indeed, researchers routinely seek to
establish the real-world relevance of theory-based explanatory
models (particularly concerning cognitive abilities and personal-
ity traits) through the use of differential descriptive constructs. It
is telling that the opposite is only very scarcely the case.
The most prominent constructs in differential psychology, the
general factor of intelligence “g” and the largely orthogonal per-
sonality trait dimensions of the Five Factor Model, were founded
with few-or-no explanatory tasks inmind (Meehl, 1998; Lubinski,
2000), and have built their reputations instead on robust statis-
tical properties and impressive correlations with life-outcomes.
The “g” construct is an illustrative example, for contrary to com-
mon opinion, g is not an explicitly (linguistically) defined con-
struct that is supported by a nexus of covarying statistical trends
between many measures. Instead, “g” is simply a name given to a
robust statistical nexus of covariation (Lubinski, 2000). Similarly,
the orthogonal factor structures of the Five Factor Model of per-
sonality take precedence over any worded definition of the factors
in question, in a sense making the definition of the factors intrin-
sically and permanently subject to interpretation (Cattell, 1996;
McCrae and Costa, 1999; Grucza and Goldberg, 2007).
The esteem and popular use of such descriptive constructs
has, however, led to their insertion into domains that do not
match their original intentions or conceptual strengths.While dif-
ferential descriptive constructs have proven their value through
predictive correlations with achievement and outcome measures
(Lubinski, 2000), in recent decades the literature has seen the rise
and growing acceptance of individual differences papers which
employ said descriptive constructs as proposed causative agents
in simple explanatory theories (see Boag, 2011 for a detailed
account). This form of explanation-description substitution pro-
duces a range of far-reaching conceptual problems, particularly
with regard to circular reasoning and reification. As the following
examples demonstrate, there are limited circumstances in natu-
ral science where empirical inquiry into antecedent causes cannot
continue, and detailed description is embraced as a surrogate
form of explanation. This explanatory approach is viable for only
aminority of natural phenomena, and is intrinsically ill-suited for
psychology and cognitive science.
LIMITING CASES
When utilizing descriptive constructs in the role of causative
agents, one is relying upon the assumption that reliable trends
in observable behaviors are indicative of specific causal forces,
be they agents or merely “laws” of expression (Boring, 1950).
While this assumption is far from unheard of in some natural sci-
ences, the subject matter of many scientific fields are not nearly
as obfuscated by the black box limitations inherent to psychology.
For two examples, consider the well-regarded fields of classical
molar chemistry andmoderate-scale Newtonian physics (Kitcher,
1985). These two fields have enviably few ambiguities in their sub-
ject matter, provided they are measured with sufficiently accurate
instruments. Subsequently, both molar chemistry and Newtonian
physics are founded upon reliable explanatory ‘laws’, such as Gay-
Lussac’s law or the Law of Universal Gravitation, all of which were
discovered essentially atheoretically through the logical induction
of observable trends. While these inquiries yielded theories, they
did not require any assumed theoretical framework to under-
take. In the terminology advocated by Cervone (1999, 2004,
2005), the explanatory method employed in these two exam-
ples, and subsequently misemployed when employing descriptive
psychological constructs in explanatory roles, is referred to as top-
down explanation (see also Kitcher, 1985; Salmon, 1989; Glennan,
2002).
Top-down explanation relies upon the induction of reliable,
structural trends and distinctions, based purely on observational
regularities. Of particular interest to psychologists, research pro-
grams that employ a top-down explanatory approach are directly
compatible with population-level data, as inductions are best
made statistically from a wide pool of nomothetic observations.
In some sciences, such as chemistry and physics, sufficiently
robust observational trends can be reliably assumed to correlate
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with fundamental causal forces, but such accounts are minor-
ity cases not to be confused with the wider sense of explanation,
which relies upon giving accounts of causal antecedence (explored
in-depth in Kitcher, 1985).
In the example of the Law of Universal Gravitation, Newton
described in great detail the patterns of relative moment between
bodies with mass, and ascribed the name gravity to the consis-
tencies observed (Keesing, 1998). Thus in Newton’s model, it is
true that positing the force of gravity successfully explains the
movement of objects with mass (within particular limits), but the
phenomena of gravity itself remains merely described, and not
explained at all. To this day, physicists struggle with competing
theories in an effort to give a substantial antecedent-based expla-
nation of gravitation and mass, but in Newton’s era the viable
limit of inquiry had been reached, and it was enough to say
that the explanatory effort could end at a detailed description of
the most fundamental accessible cause. Though such reasoning
is inescapably circular, this description-explanation substitution
was accepted due to the immense regularity of the patterns being
observed, and because the phenomena in question are so funda-
mental and causally inscrutable, that the act of reification would
not result in the premature dismissal of accounts of true causal
antecedents. In psychology, however, this is far from the case.
MISAPPLICATION
The most prominent contemporary example of descriptive con-
structs being invoked as top-down explanations of behaviors, are
those centered on the Five Factor Model of personality (McCrae
and Costa, 1994, 1997). The problems with attempting to use
super-ordinate traits in this manner are two-fold: Firstly, psy-
chological phenomena do not meet the conditions of simplic-
ity and observational clarity required to employ an empirically
coherent top-down analysis, as most relevant behaviors demand
some interpretation or contextual inference to be studied (De
Los Reyes and Kazdin, 2008). Human (and animal) behaviors
are the result of many cumulative causal forces, whose patterns
and configurations cannot in any way be directly induced from
observable behavioral trends (Cervone, 2004, 2005). Second,
these super-ordinate personality traits are proposed as explana-
tions of the very behaviors that they are aggregated from. This
represents internally-inconsistent circular reasoning, as a dis-
crete phenomenon cannot be coherently understood to cause
itself (Skinner, 1953; Hanson, 1958; Nozick, 1981; Bandura, 1999;
Cervone, 2005; for a more complete treatment of the logical
inconsistencies and reification errors in personality trait models,
see Boag, 2011).
While the aforementioned conceptual problems are readily
identified by those familiar with cases of circular reasoning,
attention must also be drawn to the practical and methodolog-
ical barrier between said constructs and explanatory theories in
psychology. Although differential psychologists can and do uti-
lize repeated-measures and other within-persons approaches, the
majority of popular descriptive constructs are derived nomoth-
etically, based upon between-persons patterns within sampled
populations, and are thus befittingly labeled “difference variables”
(Lubinski, 2000). Generally, these population-level variables are
presumed to serve as indicators of some intrapersonal factor that
determines an individual’s contribution to the variation within a
group, but as is pointed out by Borsboom and Dolan (2006), such
assumptions cannot be embraced without empirical support. To
simply presume equivalence between hypothetically related vari-
ables, when one exists on the individual-level and the other on
the population-level, is conceptually unsound. These concep-
tual problems compound even further the more aggregated or
abstracted a construct is from direct behavioral measurements. A
clear example of this conceptual error can be found in the works
of Kanazawa (2010a), which investigate “intelligence” as an adap-
tation for negotiating evolutionarily novel stimuli, while relying
methodologically upon the general factor g (Kanazawa, 2006a,b,c,
2007; Lynn and Kanazawa, 2008; Kanazawa and Perina, 2009;
Kanazawa and Reyniers, 2009; Kanazawa, 2010a,b). Kanazawa’s
theories presuppose the existence of a mechanism of general
problem-solving, which is further assumed to correlate with
population-level intelligence-differentials so closely that the g
construct can be taken as its direct measure. As Borsboom and
Dolan (2006) demonstrate, neither the probable existence of this
mechanism, nor its presumed correlation to g have any substan-
tive empirical or theoretical support. Conversely there are also
a number of compelling reasons to believe that domain-general
problem-solving mechanisms of the sort described cannot exist
coherently in a computational framework (see Penke et al., 2011
for details). Kanazawa’s use of g illustrates precisely the kinds
of conceptual errors that arise when the untenable “top-down”
explanatory approach native to differential psychology attempts
direct integration with more robust theories, which rely upon a
“bottom-up” approach to explanation.
BOTTOM-UP EXPLANATIONS AND PROCESS MODELS
In contrast to top-down explanatory methods, Cervone (1999,
2005) also speaks of their conceptual opposite, called sim-
ply “bottom-up” explanation. This is the form of explanation
predominantly referenced throughout this paper, and is the
approach required by adaptationism. Bottom-up explanations
are comprised of either literally specified causal antecedents,
or functionally-defined approximations of possible literal causal
antecedents, hypothesized to underlie the phenomena of inter-
est (Cervone, 2005). To varying degrees, all process models in
psychology (specified at the level of an individual) are designed
to employ a bottom-up explanatory approach, as they rely upon
establishing the counterfactual causes of the phenomena in ques-
tion (Edwards and Jaros, 1995). There are, however, two key
conceptual limitations to the use of classical process models in
seeking bottom-up explanations. The first issue concerns the rela-
tive completeness of a process account, while the second concerns
the difficulty in addressing the first issue via the integration of
multiple models.
INCOMPLETE AND INCOMPATIBLE
Process models have been proposed to describe innumerable
specific domains of cognition: the expression of innate temper-
aments (Richards, 1986; Eysenck, 1994; Mauer and Borkenau,
2007; Aron et al., 2010), the formation of attitudes (Tybout
and Scott, 1983; Park et al., 2007), detail-extraction in percep-
tion (Marslen-Wilson and Warren, 1994; Vandenbroucke et al.,
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2009; Wascher and Beste, 2010), and in social learning processes
in general (Bandura, 1986, 1989), to name only a few. Each
of these examples demonstrates that strong theories of proba-
ble internal operations can (and must) be induced from a wide
variety of formative and design-related clues. However, each the-
ory is also fundamentally incomplete when considering the black
box nature of the mind. In order to be reliably scrutinized via
hypothesis-testing, a theory should account for at least some form
of influence at all relevant stages of information-transformation
between input stimuli and behavioral output. For example, a
process account of reacting to a perceived stimuli should give
some consideration to each stage of influence, from perception,
to recognition, to motivation, to contemplation, and finally to
expression, because variations at any of these levels would funda-
mentally change the observed input-output contingencies. While
such a task may be impossible to achieve in exhaustive detail, and
no theorist could be reasonably held to so lofty a standard, the
more complete a theory’s account of the causal sequence is, the
lower the chances that some overlooked variable might skew or
invalidate the results.
An intuitive solution to this issue would be to rely on existing
process models of related psychological phenomena to supple-
ment those points in a model where intervention would be
meaningful. Unfortunately, the persistence of this problem can
be largely attributed to issues of terminology, which present an
obstacle to integration. Even those processes whose causal path-
ways of interest may appear mutually compatible are often kept
separate by the incompatible referential terminologies of the fields
from which they originate (Henriques, 2003). For example, Ho
and Fung (2011) published a detailed process model of for-
giveness, designed to account for some cultural influences on
when and how forgiveness occurs and is displayed. By defin-
ing the process of forgiveness in terms of changes in affect
and appraisal toward a transgressor, Ho and Fung adopted a
functional approach well-suited to cross cultural comparisons,
allowing for the simultaneous consideration of emotion, moti-
vation, and other cognitions (for background on this approach,
see Enright and Fitzgibbons, 2000). While this model does well
by considering a wide variety of potential points of influence in
the forgiveness process, some stages (deliberation and expres-
sion, in particular) are construed in such a manner as to leave
their relationship to other published models vague. Rather than
indicating how related models overlap with the stages described,
or alternatively, justifying why the existing distinctions prevalent
in the literature are inappropriate in this context, both inter-
pretations appear potentially viable. For example, the model
(p.79) defines a process of “dialectical thinking” as a major stage
in forgiveness, but gives limited elaboration on what this con-
sists of. From the descriptions, dialectical thinking appears to
involve comprehension and attribution, cognitions that have also
been addressed with cognitive process models in recent years
(Rosset, 2008; Ali et al., 2011). Unfortunately, the authors nei-
ther acknowledge this potential overlap, nor explain why the
terminology used is to be preferred. It seems that the possibility
of integration was simply not considered, and that the distinc-
tions employed in this model are idiomatic to the research task.
Similarly, the forgiveness model accounts for cultural sources of
variance in the emotion-negotiation and expression of forgiving
sentiments, but not in a manner immediately compatible with
prevailing process models of emotion-regulation (Ochsner and
Gross, 2008; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). It seems that with sev-
eral basic changes to the defining terminology, this model of
forgiveness could potentially be integrated with models of related
phenomena, to yield testable predictions in far more substantive
detail. Such conceptual clashes are par-for-the-course in psy-
chology research, with only a minority of new theories showing
explicit aspirations for wider integration (see Sheldon, 2011, as
an example).
INTEGRATION THROUGH ADAPTATIONISM
The paradigm of evolutionary psychology offers a valuable poten-
tial solution: the standardization of referential language into
the terminology of modern computational cognitive psychol-
ogy (Cosmides and Tooby, 2000). An adaptationist theory must
be either functionally-oriented toward behavioral outcomes, or
hypothesize directly about literal psychological mechanisms. As
such, employing evolutionary terminology ensures that effec-
tively any process theory can be expressed in a manner highly
compatible with many (and potentially all) other psychological
mechanisms (Buss, 2005). Unlike other more abstract procedu-
ral concepts, adapted psychological mechanisms are conceptually
primed to integrate on the basis of function (see Tooby and
Cosmides, 2005 for further discussion). Beyond this, adaptation-
ists can qualify meaningful predictions purely on the level of
manifest behavior, because any well-designed adaptation must
not interfere with the successful engagement of other mecha-
nisms, except in explicit conditions of evolutionary mismatch
(explained further in Cosmides and Tooby, 2001). In these two
ways, the grounding theories of evolutionary psychology allow
for potentially any process-based theory to be incorporated into
more complete, conceptually sound, bottom-up theories. As
such, adaptationist theories demonstrate a conceptual interplay
between descriptive and explanatory tasks not commonly seen
psychological science.
THE EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
As was explored in the preceding sections, the prevailing
methods in differential psychology cater specifically to the
scientific task of description, and are thus not only theoretically-
impoverished with regard to explanation, but appear irrecon-
cilable with more theoretically-robust approaches (Anderson,
2005; Muncer, 2011). These arguments are not to be taken
as a general indictment of differential psychology, which
remains a highly successful and instructive descriptive enter-
prise, but merely as a warning and reminder that top-
down explanations are scientifically ill-suited to psychological
phenomena.
The descriptive nomothetic data provided by prominent dif-
ferential psychology constructs are commonly designed for highly
generalized predictions of outcomes, rather than to provide
details that disambiguate the mysteries of particular explanatory
models (Lubinski, 2000). This explanatory neutrality represents
the primary obstacle to researchers hoping to harness statistically
powerful descriptions in aid of explanatory hypothesis-testing.
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Such researchers must struggle to interpret the meaning of quan-
titative differences that, as explored above, often do not easily
map onto linguistic definitions (Cervone, 1999, 2004, 2005). If
theorists hope to modify descriptive constructs to better inform
causal explanations, population-level behavioral variations must
be measured in a manner more indicative of the intrapersonal
variables suspected to cause them (Borsboom and Dolan, 2006).
That is to say, individual-differences measures must be adjusted
so as to preserve (rather than control or mask) individual-level
details that map onto the relevant features of explanatory theo-
ries. Without such considerations, any research paradigm seeking
to bridge the gap between its specific hypotheses and the wider
observations of differential psychology, must struggle in vain to
match those elements in their explanatory theories thought to
produce systemic variations, to the form said variation is expected
to take on a generalized behavioral level.
Though some integration efforts have endured for decades
(Buss, 1984, 2009), only in recent years have leading evolution-
ary psychologists embraced the task of modifying and expanding
traditional adaptationist theories, in order to account not only
for sources of random variation, but also variations preserved or
arising from selective forces (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990; Confer
et al., 2010; Buss and Hawley, 2011). The following section briefly
details some recent expansions of evolutionary theory into areas
once thought to be the exclusive purview of classical differential
psychology.
WHEN SELECTION MAINTAINS VARIATION
Since the infancy of evolutionary psychology, Buss (1984, 1991,
1995, 2009) has explored the concept that a species may evolve a
species-typical suite of adaptive interaction strategies (rather than
a single “one size fits all” strategy), which are activated or deacti-
vated developmentally as a means of calibrating an individual to
the to the particular adaptive challenges of their lifetime (see also,
Marsh and Boag, 2010). Despite the promise of this conception
with regard to understanding personality psychology, this model
presupposed a complex adapted system whose existence must be
second-order to, and in principle shaped-by, the more basic selec-
tive influences thought to also produce systemic variation (Buss
and Greiling, 1999). As such, the greatest advances over the past
10 years of variation-focused evolutionary psychology have com-
prised a range of sophisticated conceptual and empirical synthe-
ses, aimed at exploring nuanced and often-overlooked Darwinian
effects on the cognitive and dispositional properties of human
individuals (Michalski and Shackelford, 2010). Speaking broadly,
three largely distinct selective phenomena have been refined as
viable sources of systemic individual differences in evolved psy-
chology: First, that some dispositions and tendencies represent
selectively-neutral or frequency-dependent fitness tradeoffs (as in
the case of some personality traits). Second, that some abilities
vary due their configural sensitivity to mutation-selection balance
(as in the variables of human intelligence). Lastly, in accordance
with Buss’s founding insights, some psychological phenomena
may vary as a function of niche-selecting mechanisms, be they
cognitive or epigenetic. This final conception of variation remains
largely in its infancy, and will not be discussed at length here
(for a wide overview of the potential impact of this perspective
on both addressing and redefining psychopathology, see Kennair,
2011).
With regards to fitness tradeoffs, early research (see
Buss, 1995) investigated the influence that highly flexible,
rapidly-changing environments, would likely have on the
slow inter-generational process of trait-favoring selection in a
population. Analysis suggests that some human ancestral envi-
ronments may appear selectively-neutral by virtue of selective
pressures either frequently changing, or being too contingent
on intra-generational factors (see Belsky, 1999 for summary).
This analysis was enriched by increasingly sophisticated trade-
off theories, hypothesizing that the fitness optima of highly
variant traits are in fact their “moderate” as opposed to “high”
levels, since extremes along many trait continuums are likely
to confer maladaptive side-effects (see Keller and Miller, 2006;
Nettle, 2006; Penke et al., 2007a,b; Ellis et al., 2009,for details).
Building on these insights, theorists were able to account for
the selective value of some seemingly disadvantageous, yet
common, behavioral tendencies (such as those related to both
competitive and altruistic social compulsions) via the inclusion
of costly signaling theory (see Miller, 2007 for review) and
life-history considerations (see Kaplan and Gangestad, 2005 for
relevant discussion). These investigations gave rise to the study
of frequency-dependent selection, wherein some variations are
understood to be differentially effective based on the distribution
of the same and other strategies employed by other members of
the population (see Penke et al., 2007a,b for an introduction).
With this wealth of insights, evolutionary psychologists now
possess a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the selective
pressures that likely underlie much of the systematic variation in
personality and preference (Keller and Miller, 2006; Penke et al.,
2011; Nettle, 2011).
In contrast, the traditional conception of adaptive optimiza-
tion still appears to be relevant in studying the variations found
in cognitive abilities and intelligence. Unlike variations in per-
sonality or preference, there appear to be very few tradeoffs
or contingent circumstances that render higher levels of abil-
ity anything but an unambiguous enhancement of global fitness
(Penke et al., 2007a). Fortunately, technological and analytical
advances in population genetics have allowed the once-elusive
concept mutation-selection balance to applied to the study of
cognitive ability (Keller and Miller, 2006; Penke et al., 2007a,b).
It has long been understood that the vast majority of natural
mutations between the generations of a species tend to impair
the collective functioning of their evolved adaptations. It is the
ongoing role of natural selection to counteract this accretion
of deleterious mutations by selecting against individuals with
the greatest accumulation of impairments (individuals with a
high effective “mutation-load”). The specific relevance of this
phenomenon to cognitive abilities is due to the vulnerability
of complex neurological adaptations to relatively small genetic
impairments (Michalski and Shackelford, 2010). Since the config-
uration and optimization of complex psychological adaptations
rely upon many structural and developmental provisions, the
collective influence of many coordinated genes and expression-
factors contribute to the formation of the delicate final product.
Small changes to structural characteristics or enzyme efficiencies
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can thus result in measurable reductions in the calibrated effi-
ciency of the overall mechanism (Keller and Miller, 2006). Thus,
mutation-selection balance suggests that the majority of ordinal
variation observed in the heritable characteristics of “intelli-
gence,” are due largely to negative influences of mutation-loads
not yet “filtered-out” by the omnipresent pressures of selection
(Penke et al., 2007b), which in-turn partially explains some once-
mysterious correlates of intelligence, including general health,
vascular development, and body symmetry (Penke et al., 2011).
FINDING VARIATION WITHIN MECHANISMS
The conceptual tools are now available to other researchers,
including career differential psychologists, to begin bridging the
divide between evolutionary intra-personal models and tradi-
tional individual differences methods. By engaging with explana-
tory process models, and building upon the elements of those
models which permit of individual variations (both as herita-
ble genetic biases or ontogenically calibrated strategies), new
causally-relevant hypotheses can be tested with only minor mod-
ifications to existing psychometric techniques. Although the
above-discussed modes of variation will likely be alien those
without an evolutionary background, it is now well within
the reach of differential psychologists to apply their method-
ological expertise, on both individual and population levels,
to enriching even relatively simple process-based evolutionary
theories.
The key to such efforts, however, is to embrace the lack of rel-
evance most popular differential psychology constructs have to
explanatory hypothesis-testing, and working to produce interme-
diary measurement tools and approaches that can bridge between
the predicted variations within a process model, and what form
said variation can be expected to take on an overt behavioral
level. A strong example of this kind of research can be found in
the social rank/dominance and social-exchange measures devel-
oped by Leybman and associates (Zuroff et al., 2010; Leybman
et al., 2011a,b). Although the various incarnations of these mea-
sures resemble, both in presentation and in statistical verifica-
tion, traditional differential psychometrics, fundamental design
distinctions were taken directly from existing evolutionary pro-
cess models of how humans negotiate reputation-sensitive social
exchanges. Rather than creating and factor-analyzing a pool of
items, with the goal of retroactively assigning descriptive titles
to the factors that emerge, each element of the measures was
intended to capture particular sources of intra-personal variation
in the theorized psychological mechanisms, and their statistical
validity was judged by how well response-patterns reflected this.
Not only are these measures of dominance and social-exchange
primed for testing hypotheses pertinent to the explanatory the-
ory they are inspired by, their correlations with other descriptive
constructs designed purely on the population-level can fur-
ther inform an understanding of how intra-personal variations
shape (and in the case of frequency-dependent selection, inter-
act with) the overall diversity of the population (Leybman et al.,
2011a).
In addition to providing more causally-relevant theoretical
structures for the examination of variations already explored
at the individual and population level, evolutionary-differential
integration may also, on occasion, permit insightful conceptual
revisions of some individual differences phenomena that have
otherwise eluded explanation. For example, by expanding beyond
the initial efforts of Rushton (1985, 2000, 2004), Figueredo
and colleagues have developed a new approach to studying
the General Factor of Personality (GFP), which utilizes life
history strategy as the ultimate factor organizing the seem-
ingly diffuse traits and behaviors observed (see Figueredo
et al., 2005; Figueredo and Rushton, 2009). Beyond offering
an account of the general organization of personality traits
relating to social functioning, this approach has yielded a
range of novel predictions concerning how ontogenic calibra-
tions of life history strategy, such as degree of parental sup-
port, shape variation in GFP (van der Linden et al., 2012).
Similar life history approaches have recently been applied to
other domains of normative variation that have eluded sim-
ple explanation, including the clustering of several cognitive
aptitudes and personality traits [as explored in Woodley et al.
(2013)], and the human stress response system (see Del Giudice
et al., 2011, for theoretical framing of the model, and Del
Giudice et al., 2012, for promising empirical support). Each of
these examples demonstrates a collection of psychological phe-
nomena that had been successfully identified top-down as a
reliable pattern of variation by differential psychologists, but
which eluded explanation and a source of novel predictions in
the absence of a functional account of evolved psychological
mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
In closing, this article has explored both the historical origins
and contemporary impact of a perceived incompatibility between
differential and evolutionary psychology, within the wider con-
text of the unique challenges psychology faces as a science. The
core of this incompatibility can be traced to confusions over, and
a lack appreciation for, the distinct scientific tasks of descrip-
tion and explanation. Exclusive specialization in quantitative
descriptive statistics has left differential psychology institution-
ally powerful, but theoretically-impoverished and conceptually
isolated, with only limited means of applying its descriptive
prowess to causal explanatory models. Evolutionary psychology
has demonstrated a range of empirical and conceptual strengths
that support its suitability as an integrating platform for func-
tional cognitive and behavioral science. This strength has most
recently manifested as a series of sophisticated and highly suc-
cessful attempts to expand into the territories of differential
psychology, thus establishing a range of innovative new means
of describing and explaining the underlying causes of individual
differences.
Researchers now have the foundations laid for them to develop
new, theoretically-rich descriptive tools which can contribute
directly to the hypothesis-testing of explanatory process mod-
els. Particularly when utilizing the heuristic tools of evolutionary
psychology, even researchers inexperienced with adaptationism
can work to bridge the conceptual gaps between our theories
of functional, psychological mechanisms, and our accounts of
tendencies and abilities in individuals and the population at
large.
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